How did the War on Terror impact Al-Qaida in the decade after 9/11?
 
This is the first book to analyse the inner workings of the group through the eyes of its mid-level leaders in Pakistan, who were, in practice, running al-Qaida’s affairs when communications with Osama bin Laden were slow or absent.
 
The book relies on a large collection of little-known Arabic primary sources about al-Qaida, including the “Abbottabad documents” - the group’s own, internal communications between 2002-2011. Al-Qaida’s performance is assessed in three areas: the war in Afghanistan; the war in Iraq; and international terrorism. Chapters explain why the group’s contributions to the Afghan war were modest, shows the reasons for Al-Qaida’s inability to influence events in Iraq, and charts its fading ability to organize international terrorist attacks.
 
The Abbottabad documents reveal that Al-Qaida’s demise after 9/11 was not simply the result of effective counterterrorism. Rather, the group’s organizational weaknesses and the fallibilities of individual leaders played a vital role. The book gives us the first glimpse into the instances where bin Laden’s lack of strategy meant al-Qaida’s mid-level leadership had to grapple with the consequences. It also documents the detrimental impact of the relationship between al-Qaida and the Taliban.